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1. SOME HUMAN FACTORS PROBLEMS IN PROCESS 
PLANT SAFETY AND RELIABILITY ANALYSIS 
Introduction 
Methods for systematic reliability and 
safety analysis are gaining increasing ac-
ceptance as important tools for industrial 
process plant design. The size of modern plant 
units implies high risk potential, and the 
rapid development of new processes and equip-
ment makes it increasingly difficult to ensure 
the fulfilment of severe safety requirements 
by means of specific technical norms and 
standards. 
There is a trend towards the situation 
when a plant concept will only be acceptable, 
if it can be demonstrated by a systematic ana-
lysis that the safety and reliability require-
ments will be met by the operating plant. To be 
susceptible to systematic analysis, a plant de-
sign is subject to several constraints related 
to the limitations and assumptions of the 
accepted methods of analysis. 
Guidelines for system design can therefore 
be derived by an analysis of the assumptions 
and limitations underlying the methods for 
reliability and safety analysis. 
The scope of the present note is to dis-
cuss the possibility of obtaining guides to 
man-machine interface design in this way. 
The terms, safety and reliability, are not 
too well defined. In the following discussion, 
they are used to characterize two different 
aspects of the sensitivity to accidental mal-
operation of a process plant. 
Reliability is a measure of the ability 
of a system to maintain the specified function. 
Classical reliability analysis leads to figures 
describing the probability that a system will 
perform the specified function during a given 
period or at a given time (M.T.B.F., Availabi-
lity etc.). Reliability analysis is related to 
the effects caused by absence of specified 
function. In case of a process plant reliability, 
figures are used to judge the expected average 
loss of production; in case of a safety system 
to judge the expected average loss of protection. 
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System safety is a measure of the risk or 
the expected average losses, caused directly 
ty the presence of a state of accidental mal-
operation, in terms of human injuries, loss 
of equipment etc. To judge the safety of a 
system, it is, therefore, necessary to study 
the probability of specific courses of events 
initiated by the primary fault, and to relate 
the probability to the effects of the malope-
ration, i.e., judgement of system safety is 
based upon an extensive accident analysis. 
In the following discussion a very clear-
cut distinction between the methods used for 
reliability and safety analyses is drawn, and 
very simplistic descriptions of the methods are 
used. This is tolerable since the purpose of 
the discussion only is to reach some preliminary 
and general conclusions. 
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2. HUMAN FACTORS PROBLEMS IN RELIABILITY 
ANALYSIS 
The definition of the reliability of a 
system or system component is generally stated 
in terms of the probability of specified func-
tion versus time, such as: "Reliability is 
defined as that characteristic of an item ex-
pressed by the probability that it will per-
form its required function in the desired manner 
under all relevant conditions and on the occa-
sion or during the time intervals when it is 
required so to perform" (Green and Bourne 1972) . 
Reliability analysis evaluates the possible 
modes, and probability of, departures from spe-
cified function, which is generally rather stable 
during plant operation of the technical equip-
ment, and unambiguously related to the func-
tional design intention. The human elements of 
a system, however, cause difficulties in this 
basic aspect of reliability analysis. Man is 
an adaptive and learning system element, and may 
very probably respecify a function or a task. 
Consider for example a monitoring task from a 
power plant. The specified task: "If the fre-
quency meter indicates below 58 C/S, disconnect 
load to save the generator". If an operator has 
only met readings below 58 C/S due to poor meter 
performance, he may very reasonably respecify 
his task: "If , then calibrate meter" -
and lose a generator (as happened at one stage 
in the US power black out in 3965). Unless such 
respecifications are known, reliability pre-
diction will be systematically wrong. 
Furthermore, a human operator is a multi-
purpose element. He may be occupied by another 
task, and omission of specified function may 
be due to other events in the system rather 
than human failure mechanisms. 
The method of reliability analysis is to 
break-down a complex system into parts or 
components, to a iev.^ 1 at which component pro-
perties are recognized from widespread use, so 
that empirical fault data can be collected. 
In principle, this break-down must be 
carried through to a level where component 
function is invariace with application. This 
is possible for many standard components, 
which are designed for a specific function 
and used according to specifications in system 
design, e.g., resistors, pumps. In some cases, 
however, alternative "specified functions" are 
possible at the level of break-down at which 
data collection can be arranged. 
4 
in practice, e.g., relays and valves can serve 
to close or break a circuit. Fault data must 
then be classified according to the function 
performed, as the related probabilities of 
failure may be very different for different functions. 
In the methods of human reliability pre-
diction in practical use (Keister 1972, Swain 
1973), this technique has been transferred to 
human performance. The complex and often 
very system-specific human functions are broken 
down into typical, recurrent, and elementary 
functions for which reliability data can be 
collected. Such elementary functions are in 
practice only distinguishable by their external 
effects, and are therefore generally characte-
rized as "subtasks". 
This technique, however, must be used with 
extreme caution. Man is in many respects a 
holistic data processor responding to total 
situations rather than to individual events or 
system states. Complex functions may be performed 
by skilled operators as one integrated and 
automated response. In this case fault data can 
only be obtained by a realistic simulation of 
the total function (Regulinski 1969) . Break-down 
of complex functions is only acceptable if the 
performance is paced by the system, i.e., cues 
from the system serve to initiate elementary 
skilled subroutines individually and to control 
their sequence. This is the case in many manual 
tasks, e.g., mechanical assembly tasks, but 
can probably also be arranged by more complex 
mental tasks by properly designed interface 
systems. 
The failure properties of a specific function 
depend upon the operating conditions, and for 
technical components weighting functions are 
generally used to modify fault data according to 
load and environmental effects. The great varia-
bility of human performance makes a similar 
weighting of fault data by "performance shaping 
factors" mandatory (Swain 1973), but the appli-
cation is difficult as "operating conditions", 
such as motivation, stress, fatigue, etc., are 
badly defined and difficult to quantify; "expert 
judgements" are generally the only method 
available. 
New problems arise if several internal mecha-
nisms with very different failure probabilities 
can serve the same external component function. 
The more flexible a component is, the more diffi-
cult will these problems be, especially if the 
internal organization has autonomous features such as 
optimization, adaptation, learning. 
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These are the prominent features of the 
human elements in a system. The internal function 
used to perform a specific external task by a 
man depends strongly upon his training and skill, 
his prior experiences of system behaviour, his 
subjective performance criteria etc. Failure data 
collected from a system in which an operator 
meets a specific task frequently,and performs 
it by a sensory-motor response based on a one-step 
direct association, will have no relation to the 
failure probability in a system where the demand 
for the task is infrequent, e.g., as part of an 
emergency action. The response must then be per-
formed by a sequence of cognitive functions. The 
resulting problem can only be solved by classi-
fying fault data according to the internal functions 
used to perform a task. In this situation, weighting 
of fault data collected from standard, frequently 
initiated tasks, by means of "performance shaping 
factors" is not acceptable. 
At present, this means that human reliability 
prediction is only feasible, if "specified function" 
of human operators is synonymous with a familiar 
task performed by a skill maintained through 
frequent use or exercise. 
The degree of sophistication of the probabilistic 
system models used to derive reliability figured 
characterizing the total system depend upon the 
quality of the component fault data available. 
If only bulk data on component failure rates are 
available, as is typically the case for process 
plant components, simple probabilistic models are 
used which represent system structure only as far as to 
specify whether components functionally are connected 
in series or parallel during specified system function 
(reliability block diagrams). If more detailed de-
scriptions of failure mechanisms are available., and 
if good data are available for failure and repair 
rates, then much more complete failure modelling 
becomes worthwhile. 
j. HUMAN FACTORS PROBLEMS IN SAFETY ANALYSIS 
System safety is a measure of the risk -
the expected average loss - related to direct 
effects of the transitions from specified func-
tion into a state of accidental maloperation, 
in terms of human injuries or damage to equip-
ment or environment. 
System safety has to be judged from an 
extensive accident analysis. To identify the 
course of events following the initiating fault, 
and to determine the ultimate effect,and its 
probability, it is necessary to use a detailed 
functional description of the system including 
functional properties both within and outside 
the normal operating regimes of the plant. 
Different systematic techniques have been 
developed for this purpose, based on fault tree 
analysis (Barlow and Lambert 1974) and cause-
consequence analysis (Nielsen 1971) . 
To evaluate the effects of accidental mal-
operation, statistical data differentiating the 
different modes of failure of the components 
must be available. Furthermore, severe effects 
generally are results of courses of events of 
extremely low probability, and may be related 
to component modes of failure which are an a priori 
improbable and insignificant contributor to 
component bulk data. 
In the analysis of accidents, the human 
element is the imp of the system. His inven-
tiveness makes it impossible to predict the 
effects of his actions when he makes errors, 
and it is impossible to predict his reaction 
in a sequence of accidental events, as he very 
probably misinterprets an unfamiliar situation. 
Some illustrating case stories are found in 
the appendix. 
In practice, human variability makes 
a quantitative safety analysis unrealistic, 
unless the system design satisfies a number of 
conditions. 
r.iike other problems in system design caused 
by component performance variability, the pro-
blems in accident analysis can be circumvented 
if feed-back function: ?re introduced, i.e., 
if feed-back links are introduced in accidental 
courses of events by means of monitoring and 
protection functions. 
Major losses or human injuries caused by 
accidental maloperation are typically related 
to uncontrolled release of stored energy in 
the system. Apart from accidents caused by 
spontaneous fractures of energy barriers and 
explosions, accidents are typically the effects 
of disturbances of mass or energy balances. 
There is, therefore, a time delay between the 
primary cause and the release due to the inte-
grating effect of a disturbed balance. This 
time delay makes correcting actions possible. 
Furthermore, critical variables related to 
the energy level of the balance can be found 
which can indicate potentially risky malopera-
tion irrespectively of the preceeding course 
of events. If a safe state of the system can be 
defined, and it can be reached through the 
action of a monitoring and protection function 
which does not in itself introduce potential 
risks, an upper bound of the probability of 
a large class of event sequences leading to 
the effect which is monitored can be found by 
a reliability analysis of the protecting 
function. Such protective functions can be 
performed by human operators if the task is 
designed so as to be accessible to human operator 
reliability analysis, or can be performed by 
automatic safety systems. 
A properly designed protective function 
enables the derivation of the probability figures 
needed in accident analysis by means of a 
reliability analysis of the protective function. 
The analysis leads directly to upper bounds on 
probability of courses of events leading to the 
monitored effect. 
It is the extensive use of automatic, pro-
tective systems in nuclear power plants that has 
made it possible to perform a quantitative 
analysis - including human performance - of the 
safety level of such installations (Norman 
Rasmussen et al. 1975). 
4 . CONCLUSION 
In principle, a process plant design, 
which is not based on extensive experience 
from similar concepts, is only acceptable 
if performance design targets can be veri-
fied by systematic analysis including a 
quantitative reliability and safety analysis. 
A quantitative safety analysis is only 
possible if the plant design is performed 
according to guidelines derived from the limi-
tations of the available methods. 
The design must be based upon a qualitative 
accident analysis. Accident potentials cannot 
be identified by an evaluation of the effects 
of all possible courses of accidental events. 
They must be identified directly by a systematic 
search. Heuristic search strategies related to 
energy and poisonous matter concentrations have 
been developed to serve this purpose (Johnson 
1973, Powers 1973) . 
When accident potentials are identified in 
this way, the sequences of accidental events, 
which are capable of triggering an accident, 
must be identified by a systerr.atic, qualitative 
cause-consequence or fault tree analysis. If a 
quantitative probabilistic evaluation of the 
sequences so identified indicates unacceptable 
risk - or if a quantitative analysis is not 
possible due to lack of statistical data, 
monitoring and protection functions must be 
introduced in the design. 
Such functions must be designed so as to 
be accessible to a quantitative reliability 
analysis. During the reliability analysis of 
complex protective systems, it is generally 
important to keep track of the temporal rela-
tions of events, and simple reliability block 
diagram analysis must be replaced by more 
sophisticated methods, such as Markov models, 
renewal theory etc., compatible with a cause-
consequence analysis (Nielsen et al. 1974, 
Taylor 1974, Nielsen et al. 1975). 
A protective function can be performed by 
an automatic system or a human operator. 
Reliability analysis of human performance 
is only feasible if the tasks are performed by 
sequences of skilled subroutines which are 
separated and initiated by proper cues from the 
system. The reliability of more complex and 
freerunning tasks cannot be predicted directly; 
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an acceptable prediction of results can only be 
made in this situation if the effects of the 
actions are reversible and subject to verification 
by an operator, following a predictable check 
procedure. 
Automation in this way does not remove man 
from a system, neither does it force him into 
the role of a trained robot. Automation serves 
to replace unexpected tasks at unpredictable 
moments by tasks which can be planned and 
trained and which can be based upon qualified 
decisions, such as supervision, test, and 
maintenance. 
A proper design policy will decrease 
the influence of unpredictable performance 
shaping factors, such as stress and motivation. 
When introducing automatic safety systems, the 
designer takes responsibility of plant safety 
and thus relieves the operator from stress. 
The actions of safety systems are related to 
rather general criteria concerning the ini-
tiating plant states and complex, safe pro-
tective systems will decrease plant relia-
bility. The operator thus has a supervisory 
task to protect the plant from unnecessary 
automatic safety actions. The responsibility 
of the operators is related to the reliability 
of plant operation. 
The motivation of plant operators can be 
maintained in automatic systems if they are 
allowed to use their abilities and tak.3 re-
sponsibility in the tasks they are allocated. 
There is no reason not to permit this as long as 
the system is designed in a way which allows 
them to verify the effects of t.heir decisions 
and actions in a predictable way. 
In a period when rapid development of display 
equipment takes place, and schemes for human error 
data collection are beina planned, there is a need 
for research in human behaviour in operating indu-
strial plants. 
The scope of such research will be to iden-
tify and characterize the different data proces-
sing functions and strategies used by human ope-
rators in real life tasks. The ultimate goal will 
be to develop guidelines for the design of inter-
face systems which will be used by operators in a 
predictable way, and to define the attributes of 
the different categories of operator tasks which 
should be used when collecting human error data 
from industrial plants. 
10 
5. EVALUATING OPERATOR RELIABILITY - ERROR 
MECHANISMS AND DESIGN PROBLEMS 
"ELEMENTARY ACTION 
MODEL OF HUMAN 
ERROR 
1) The AIR Data Store (Payne and Altman 1962) 
gives times and reliabilities for different 
operator actions using a Stimulus-Response 
scheme. By describing the individual steps 
of a task the time and reliability for the 
task can be evaluated. Many parameters such as 
instrument size and placing serve to modify the 
reliability and timing values • 
2) THERP (Swain 1973) is a collection of methods 
for predicting operator reliability in control and 
production processes, by dividing tasks into sub-
tasks, at a level for which data can be provided 
from the THERP data base. An event tree is drawn 
for the complete operator task, and probabilities 
are attached to the various event forks. Proba-
bilities for each path from the base of the event 
tree (correct operation and various error paths) 
are calculated. The possibility for error correc-
tion is treated, and event/operation sequences to 
deal with the possibility of error recovery are 
included. Point estimates of reliability for each 
of the elementary operations, are used, with a 
standard set of performance shaping factors modi-
fying these. The performance shaping factors are 
applied as considered appropriate by the beha-
vioural scientist using the technique. 
A strong point in the THERP technique is 
to distinguish clearly between cue, action, and 
confirmation (feedback). The probability for 
error is the probability of erroneous cueing 
or action, multiplied by the probability of 
misidentifying the confirmation of correct 
action. 
3^ Askren and Regulinski's model (1969) has 
been developed primarily for continuous tasks 
and aims at finding error rates as a function 
of time. Laboratory experimental data are used. 
Time dependent error rates are used, and in this 
way account for some of the variation treated by 
performance shaping factors in THERP. 
All of these techniques (and also most of 
the others of which we know) suffer from problems 
when applied to the situation of safety analysis, 
for a process operator, in a control room. 
There are several models at present in use 
for predicting operator reliability during pro-
cess instrumentation design. Three of them can 
be described here as examples (from Meister 1971). 
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Firstly, the breakdown into subtasks is 
completely oriented towards simple standard se-
quences of operations on equipment. The subtasks 
or elementary operations are related to the 
lowest level of man machine interface action. The 
subtasks are an interface component engineers view 
of the human being. For example, in an Aeronutronics 
report from 1969: 
"The conception of operator simulation formed 
early in the study program was based on several 
fundamental assumptions in order to develop a 
suitable working model. The first is that a task 
can be analysed as a sequence of subtasKS, the 
performance of which has been determined or 
estimated closely." 
It is far from clear that this splitting into 
subtasks is the correct approach when studying 
trained operators. They tend to regard a complete 
sequence of such low level subtasks, or elementary 
operations, as a subtask in itself. Such sequences 
may be highly trained and often very reliable; 
generally more reliable than if the operators 
were to carry out the same operations as an 
unconnected procedure. In this situation, if 
errors are made, they are made at a higher level, 
in deciding to use a procedure in the first place. 
PROBLEMS WITH 
ELEMENTARY ACTION 
APPROACH - ERRORS 
IN DECISION MAKING 
Even where a sequence of elementary opera-
tions is not highly trained, in many situations 
errors will arise in decision making, not in 
carrying out elementary operations. 
(There are three cases; a written procedure 
is available which can be read; a procedure has 
been learned, which can be remembered; a new 
procedure must be devised. This last is very 
common in failure recovery situations). 
The effect of this problem on reliability 
estimates is described below. 
A second problem is that the reliability 
models give the probability of carrying out a 
task correctly, but do not give the probability 
for, nor even describe, the other, high risk 
operations which are carried out instead. Deve-
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A further problem is that of common mode 
failures at the elementary operation level, arising 
from decision errors at a higher level. (A common 
mode failure is a case in which several failure 
events occur with some causal coupling, so that 
the events are not statistically independent. 
For example, for two events A and B, P(A.B)> P(A).P(B). 
The THERP technique can account formally for 
some kinds of common mode error (those where similar 
elementary operations in a sequence are involved), 
but not all. The presence of a common mode error 
potential can often alter probabilities for high 
consequence events by several orders of magnitude. 
An extension of the mechanistic, man machine 
interface component approach, can help to solve 
some of these problems (Taylor 1976). It is 
assumed that an operator may make an error which 
results in: 
1) Making a single erroneous elementary opera-
tion at any time (e.g. pressing a button). 
2) In any procedure, omitting an elementary 
operation. 
3) Interchanging the sequence of two elementary 
operations, or two related operation sub-
sequences . 
4) In any procedure, confusing the object of 
two operations, (e.g. mistaking button A for 
button B ) . 
5) At any point in a procedure, taking up a 
section of another procedure (e.g. half 
way through shut down, commencing a start 
up) . 
The consequences of these possibilities can 
be evaluated, using cause consequence analysis 
(Nielsen 1974) and those which indicate a high 
risk can be studied in detail. There is an as-
sumption in the method, that the operator's 
possibilities for interaction with the plant are 
limited (to button pushing, knob turning). 
By concentrating on risk, rather than pro-
bability the number of error sequences to be 
studied can be limited. (It has been noted that 
many serious incidents involve sequences of 
failure or error events, see e.g. Taylor 1973, 
Johnson 1973). For design purposes, the pro-
cedure described can illustrate potential risks, 
and allow protective instrumentation to be 
designed. 
"SCOPE FOR ERROR' 
APPROACH 
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But the procedure does not approach the problem 
of determining leliability, in the case of de-
cision making or plant state identification 
errors. And it does not approach the problems 
arising when an operator must devise his own 
procedures. 
It is possible for a designer to chose a "LIMITED OPERATOR 
philosophy which minimizes the operator's scope RESPONSIBILITY" 
for erroneous decision making ("limited operator APPROACH 
responsibility"). If a safety system is provided 
which can return a plant to a safe state from 
any unsafe state ("designed safety actions"), 
then the operator h..3 no freedom to introduce 
risk. (He still has freedom co optimize production). 
If the operator is nevertheless required to 
carry out some "required operator safety actions", 
(see ANSI draft standard N660), then procedures 
can be given for these, and training, so that 
the operator has no decisions to make, and relia-
bility analysis becomes simpler (see table 1). 
Not all systems can be designed using this philos-
ophy however. It requires that all failure states 
have been foreseen by the designer, including those 
arising from operator and design errors! Or 
at least, the designer must be prepared to take 
responsibility for all failure states, and all 
"unplanned operator actions" . 
If a designer i_s prepared to accept respon-
sibility for plant safety, and to carry out the 
necessary thorough analysis, then an alternative 
to operator error probability calculation presents 
itself. That is, to design an interlock system 
which prevents the operator errors. Systematic 
techniques for design of such interlock systems 
have been described (Rudd, Taylor). If such an 
interlock system is constructed, then the problem 
of safety in the face of foreseeable operator 
errors becomes one of interlock system reliability. 
If a correspondingly thorough analysis is 
carried through for risks arising from other plant 
disturbances, not operator errors, then the ope-
rator's function becomes largely one of controlling 
the plant to control these disturbances to maintain 
a safe operating state and prevent shutdown. For 
this purpose reliability analysis procedures, rather 
than risk analysis, are acceptable. However, such 
thorough safety system design is at present expen-
sive, in terms of engineer effort, for the majority 
of process systems. 
An approach which deals directly with the 
risks involved in decision making and erroneous 
use of procedures, i s to study complete case 
stories from actual accidents, and classify them. 
It seems possible, from cases we have looked at, 
to find definite error phenomena connected with 
the way r<\y-r-i tors think about a process plant. 
Everyday Operating Procedure 
May be very free, but requires 
feed back in order that OP can 
confirm his own uecisions. 
To allow freedom in everyday 
operating procedures, requires 
a very thorough and reliable 
automatic safety system, and/ur 
very highly trained safety 
procedures. 
Intended to optimize production 
and protect system from 
unnecessary safety shutdown. 
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Safety Procedure 
Must be highly trained in order 
that reliability data can be 
collected and reliability 
evaluation is valid. 
Requires cueing in order that 
reliability data can be collected 
and reliability evaluation is 
valid. 
Intended to protect against 
accidents. 
Table 1: Limited operator responsibility approach. 
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Thib approach is similar to that described 
by Russel Davis (1958). He describes three error 
phenomena: 
False hypothesis 
People respond to situations as they conceive 
them to be, not as they are. 
Preoccupation 
By concentrating on one part of a problem, 
a more important aspect is overlooked. 
Emergency mechanisms 
In an untoward incident, a person reacts in 
a way which his previous experience has taught 
him is likely to be effective, even in inappro-
priate situations. 
We have found a need for more detailed classes. 
Reinterpretation as instrument error 
When a very improbable accident indication 
is given, the operator reinterprets this as 
instrument error. He evaluates his action on the 
basis of probability, not on risk. (He may reca-
librate instruments rather than take readings 
at face value). 
Similar situation switchover 
When the cues provided by the plant in one 
state are the same as those for another state, 
in another procedure, the operator may switch 
procedures 'presumably after some distraction). 
Evaluation en the basis of partial information 
It is well known that operators habitually 
base their decisions on readings from just part 
of the plant information, ignoring soma of the 
information displayed. This can cause a mismatch 
between the operator's performance and the in-
strumentation enqineer's or reliability analyst's 
expectations. 
Misidentification of equipment 
Closely located, similar equipments are 
confused. 
Inter operator communication irror 
Operators seldom work completely alone, they 
communicate with each other. If an indication of 
plant state is communicated incorrectly, then an 
ac<•• id'."'n '• " v; •: •:\\\\t. 
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Private procedures 
Operators may develop their own, unsafe, 
procedures, because they are more convenient. 
Examples of incidents involvina these kinds 
of phenomena are given in the appendix. Unrelia-
bility from these mechanisms should be regarded 
as supplementary to the Lasic elementary operation 
random errors. 
While an approach involving the collection 
of case-data concerning different decision 
making errors would be interesting, it would 
suffer from the same kinds of criticism as the 
"elementary operation" approach. It would indicate 
only some of the performance shaping factors 
required. It would tend to mix data, classifying 
errors due to different mechanisms together (with 
consequent probability estimation errors, espe-
cially for "two peaked" error probability dis-
tributions) . And it would lead to many causes of 
common mode failure being overlooked. 
The classification of case stories should OPERATOR MODEL 
rather be taken to indicate that a deeper theory APPROACH 
of operator behaviour and decision making should 
be possible. If a model of the process operator 
can be produced which describes how he makes 
decisions, and carries out tasks, hov/ he 
observes and responds to cues, then more 
detailed and more firmly based estimates 
of error probability can be made. Also the 
various factors which determine probability 
can be evaluated more accurately. In some 
cases, it should be possible by a deterministic 
analysis to detect the possibility of high 
risk situations - for example when one of the 
operators possible decision making routines 
overlooks unlikely but dangerous plant states. 
In order to come further in treating plants for 
which perfect safety systems are impossible, such 
an approach is necessary. 
The patterns that emerge in some of the 
case stories given in the appendix suggest 
that -uch a program of work (fig. 1) could 
well meet with success. Some steps in this 
direction have already been taken at Risø 
(Rasmussen 1969, 1973, 1974, 1976). But 
further, there is a large body of research on 
operator ergonomics, and on decision making, 
which by adopting the operator model approach 
can be made directly relevant in risk analysis 
and safety system design. 
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The following case stories illustrate some 
of the phenomena which make reliability and 
safety prediction difficult. Unless otherwise 
indicated, they have been obtained from private 
communications with process plant operators. In 
some cases, details have been deleted, to pro-
tect both the innocent, and the unlucky. 
Case: 
During normal operation of a process plant 
the power supply to the instrumentation and the 
control console slowly disappears. 
Investigation: 
The manual main circuit breaker in the fly-
wheel motor-generator supply is found to be in 
the off position. The conclusion of an investi-
gation was that a roving operator, checking coolinq 
towers and pumps, inadvertently had switched 
from a routine check round to the friday afternoon 
shut down check round and turned off the supply. 
The routes of the two check rounds are the same, 
except that he is supposed to pass by the door of 
the generator room on the routine check, but to 
enter and turn off the supply on the shut down 
check. Something "en route" obviously has con-
ditioned him for shut down check (sunshine and 
day dreams?). The operator was not aware of his 
action, but did not reject the condition. 
Comments: 
Human operators move around in the plant, and 
it can be difficult to predict where in the causal 
structure of the plant he interferes. His actions 
may not be initiated by an event in the system or 
specified by a program, but by subconscious 
mechanisms, i.e. it is difficult to predict when 
he interferes and how. 
Case: 
During start up of a process plant the plant 
is automatically shut down during manual adjustment 
of a cooling system. 
Investigation: 
During start up the operator monitored the 
temperature of the primary cooling system and 
controlled it by switching off and on the sec-
ondary cooling pumps to avoid water condensation 
in the primary system due to the cold cooling 
water. On this occasion he observed the tempera-
ture to reach below the low limit, signalling a 
demand to switch off the secondary pumps, while 
he was talking to cooperator jver the phone. He 
then switched off the primary pumps and the plant 
immediately shut down automatically. He did not 
recognize the cause immediately, but had to 
diagnose the situation from the warning signals. 
The control keys for the two sets of pumps 
are positioned far apart on the console. A special 
routine exists during which the operator switches 
the primary pumps on and off to allow an operator 
in the basement to adjust pump valves after pump 
overhaul while they communicate by phone. Is the 
cause of the event subconscious switching of 
procedures due to the phone call? 
Comment: 
The case illustrates some features of operator 
behaviour: 
- Change in procedure? Ly secondary unpredic-
table events or conditions. 
- The operator introduces couplings in the system 
by coincident omission of one task and performance 
of an inappropriate action. 
- The risk may be related to the inappropriate 
and unpredictable act rather than to the omission. 
Case: 
An experimental plant shuts down automatically 
during normal operation due to inadvertent manual 
operation of cooling system shut off valve. 
Investigation: 
A safety shut off valve in the cooling system 
which is routinely closed during post shut down 
check procedures was closed manually. The valve 
control switch is placed behind the operating con-
sole, and so is the switch of a flood lightning 
system used for special operations monitored through 
closed circuit television. The switches are neither 
similar not closely positioned. The operator has to 
pass the valve switch on his way to the flood light 
switch. 
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In this case the operator went behind the 
console tc switch off the flood light, but 
operated the shut off valves which caused plant 
shut down through the interlock system. 
Comments: 
Strongly automated and stereotyped action 
sequences are frequently initiated by a single 
conscious decision. If the action takes some time, 
e.g., you have to move to another place to perform 
the action, the mind may return to other matters, 
and the sequence is vulnerable to unpredictable 
conditions, particularly if the sequence intended 
in some of the steps overlap other familiar and 
automated sequences. 
Case: 
Butadiene explosion at Texas City. 
Plant Safety and Loss Prevention. Volume 5, CEP. 
Investigation: 
"Loss of butadiene from the system through 
the leaking overhead line motor valve resulted in 
substantial changes in tray composition ...". 
..."The loss of liquid in the base of the column 
uncovered the calandria tubes, allowinq the tube 
wall temperature to approach the temperature of 
the heat supply. The increased vinylacetylene 
concentration and high tube wall temperature set 
the stage for the explosion which followed". 
..."The make flow meter showed a continuous flow; 
however, the operator assumed that the meter was 
off calibration since the make motor valve was 
closed and the tracing on the chart was a straight 
line near the base of the chart. The column base 
level indicator showed a low level in the base of 
the column, but ample kettle vapor was being 
generated". 
Comment: 
Wisdom after the event tells that closed valve 
together with continuous flow signals possible 
leak, and the risk implied calls for investigation. 
The skilled operator, however, conforms his obser-
vations individually with his expectations or 
process feel. If abnormal observation refers to 
a familiar situation, he sees no problem and does 
not investigate the matter. You cannot predict 
his response without knowing his daily experiences. 
It can be difficult to predict the probability 
that an operator performs a specified function 
because he may have respecified his function -
sometimes with good r :ason. 
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This can happen, even if there is a clear 
prewarning: 
Case: 
Melt down of fuel element in nuclear reactor. 
Nuclear Safety, September 1962. 
Investigation: 
Certain tests required several hundred pro-
cess coolant tubes to be blocked by neoprene 
disks. 7 disks were left in the system after the 
test, but were located by a test of the gauge 
system that monitors water pressure on each indi-
vidual process tube. For some reason the gauge on 
one tube was overlooked, and It did not appear 
in a list of abnormal gauge readings prepared 
during the test. There was an additional oppor-
tunity to spot the blocked tube when a later test 
was performed on the system. This time the pressure 
for the tube definitely indicated a blocked tube. 
The shift supervisor failed, however, to recognize 
this indication of trouble. The gauge was adjusted 
at that time by an instrument mechanic to give a 
midscale reading which for that particular tube 
was false. This adjustment made it virtually 
certain that the no flow condition would exist 
until serious damage resulted. 
Case: 
Docket 50219-167: Two diesel generators set 
out of service simultaneously. 
Event sequence: 
8.10 permission to perform surveillance test 
on containment spray system No. 1 including 
electrical and mechanical inspection of diesel 
generator No. 1. 
8.20 permission to take diesel No. 2 out of 
service for oil addition. 
Both systems out of service for 45 min. Fore-
man overlooked test of No. 1 system when permitting 
diesel No. 2 operation. 
Comment: 
Coincident unavailability of redundant 
systems caused by improper timing of routine 
tasks. Difficult to predict due to dependence on 
station "software" vulnerable for changes and 
oversight due to absence of cues from the system 
supporting attention. 
Case: 
Docket 50-219-378. Momentary interruption 
of 125 DC power supplying instrumentation with 
various safeguard systems. 
Investigation; 
Electrical ground on 125V distribution bus 
resulting in electricians being called for trouble 
shooting and repair. "Electrical grounds of this 
nature have been an infrequent problem in the past 
and as of this time no approved procedures have 
been developed." 
The electrician placed a jumber in a wrong 
position and effectively did not have the buses 
paralleled as desired. 
Comment: 
Procedures for repair on live systems cannot 
be issued for all possible faults. The consequence 
of possible faults during work on electrical 
cabling and wiring terminal systems is unpredic-
table. 
General: 
Steps in manual sequences, which are not 
initiated by system cues, but dependinu solely on 
procedures, are subject to omission or change of 
sequence. 
- Reclosing test valves Docket 50-133- , 
50-219-193, 50-219/74/21. 
- Pressure equalizing before valve operation 
Docket 50-219-153. 
- Inverting sequence of operations 
Docket 50-219-169. 
- Temperature equalizing Docket 50-219-245 
removal of test fixtures Docket 50-155-311. 
Case: 
Overpressurization of reactor coolant system. 
Docket 50-295-135. 
Investigation; 
Charging pump started to increase pressure. 
System pressure increased gradually. Station ope-
rator distracted by telephone call and left the 
area of the pump control switch. 
C o ^ nno ^  t* *, 
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in one function can be caused by ev its related 
to other functions. Causal coupling re intro-
duced. 
Case: 
A control computer for a reactor fuel charging 
machine showed a repeated alarm, but the alarm was 
ambiguous and unspecific. The operator reset the 
machine, and continued with an erroneous loading 
schedule until a fuel melt down occurred. 
Nuclear Safety Vol 12 No. 1, Jan. 1971, pp 35-39. 
Comment: 
Unreliable instrumentation leads to mistrust. 
If an incident occurs it may be interpreted as 
instrument failure. 
Conclusion: 
Instrumentation which is important for safety 
should be diversely redundant, and the designer 
should check that the operator is able to and does 
make use of this redundancy in practice. 
Case: 
A reactor was in the hot shut down condition, 
with stream bypassing the turbine to the condenser 
and bypassing of stream to the condenser. On 
increasing temperature after clearing the original 
transient, the main stream control valves suddenly 
opened, resulting in a major pressure transient, 
and shut down of the reactor. 
Docket 50-133-37. 
Cause: 
The main control valve signal was gated out 
by a temperature trip. The procedure for switching 
to manual control during trip was not followed, 
and an integral controller signal integrated the 
measured error in stream flow when compared with 
set point. When a selficiently high temperature 
was reached, the integrated "error" sianal was 
applied to the valve so that it opened fully. 
Comment: 
1) It is not clear to what extent operators 
follow procedures, nor to what extent procedures 
are all practical. 
2) It is hard for operators to foresee the 




Hydrogen explosion due to repair error. 
Nuclear Safety Vol. 17 No. 2, March 1969, 
page 2 49. 
" An isolation valve in the off-gas system 
was found to be closed instead of open. This 
forced off-gas from the steam jet air ejector 
through a loop-seal drain line from the 48-in.-
diameter holdup line to this sump and back to 
the dilution fans prior to oeing discharged 
up the Elevated Release Point. 
The valve was found to be closed even 
though the control-room valve position indica-
ting lights and the control switch showed the 
valve to be open. Changes had been made on the 
electric wiring to this valve during the previous 
outage. Approval had been given to red-line 
drawings of the valve and some associated 
valves that are part of the additional off-gas 
treatment equipment that will be put in service 
later this year. But authorization had not been 
given to change any wiring associated with the 
valve. Personnel involved in making the wiring 
change thought they had verified the proper 
position of the valve by observing the position 
of the slotted notch at the top of the stem. 
The butterfly valve gate, however, was not 
parallel to the slot as they had believed. 
An explosive meter was not used to sample 
the gases flowing from the sump, because no 
indication of hydrogen had been found in the 
past when this sump had been opened." 
Comment: 
The operator's or repair man's information 
about component performance may be in error. In 
extreme cases, many components of the same type 
may be affected by erroneous installation or 
adjustment resulting from information errors. 
Case: 
Off gas explosion due to ice build up and 
instrument interpretation error, i '.clear Safety 
Vol. 17 No. 4, July 1976, page 493 
..."The first indication of a problem came 
in the early morning hours when the control-room 
alarm indicated a low flow at the discharge of 
the off-gas dilution fan. Because of low flow, 
the instrumentation automatically started the 
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other fan and the operators then shut down the 
first one. Previous to the alarm the flow 
records for the elevated release point of the 
diluted off-gas had penned a flow decrease 
from about 1.5 m /sec (2800 cfm) to about 
1 m /sec (2200 cfm) over a period of several 
hours. However, no flow increase occurred 
after the second fan started, and a few minutes 
later a low-flow alarm sounded once again. The 
standby off-gas treatment fan was then started, 
but there was still no increase in flow on the 
recorder for the elevated release point, and 
the flow indication from the standby off-gas 
treatment fan was also low. The shift super-
visor and an operator went to the off-gas 
building to investigate and noticed that the 
building did not seem to be at its normal 
negative pressure and that the building air 
monitor indicated an increase in activity. The 
two went next to the area of the elevated 
release point but saw no indication of the 
problem. They turned to the off-g£..r building; 
however, the building air monitor was then 
reading full scale, so they left immedia-1-" y. 
Not too long thereafter the building was 
destroyed by an explosion" 
..."The incident was apparently caused by 
an ice plug that formed at the top of 100-m 
(325 ft) elevated release point pipe.".... 
..."The flow reduction progressed gra-
dually a? the ice built up and went undetected 
because the observed reduction, as indicated 
by the instrumentation, was well within normal 
variations caused by the temperature changes. 
This flow instrumentation evidently had a 
history of unreliability. In fact, after the 
complete loss of flow caused by the explosion, 
the recorder still indicated a flow of 54 
m /min (2000 cfm)." 
Comment: 
This is possibly "reinterpretation as 
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